The increasing availability of personal location data pushed by the widespread use of location-sensing technologies raises a great concern for the safeguard of location privacy for which location privacy-preserving techniques are being investigated.
Introduction
Personal location data are increasingly being collected and processed by a large variety of applications, also pushed by the increased availability of location-sensing systems such as GPS/Galileo, RFID, and sensor networks. Unfortunately, personal location information can lead to the inferences of sensitive information about individuals and thus to privacy breaches. For example the health status of an individual can be inferred from the nature of the clinics he or she visits and then disclosed to third parties without the consent of the individual. On the other hand, location information is important in a variety of applications, such data analysis and information services, and therefore it cannot be simply removed from the data being collected. The problem is thus how to protect the privacy of individuals while retaining location information at an adequate level of accuracy so that it can be effectively used in applications.
Personal location data, in its most general form, are captured as tuples of the form (userId, loc), where userId is the value of an attribute identifying the individual, such as the social security number, and loc is the location occupied at a given time by the individual. Locations are described in terms of geometric objects (say for instance, a point or a region in a coordinated space) or semantically meaningful spatial objects and descriptions, such as a house, a park, a shop's name or an address. Since a geometric object can be given one or more semantic descriptions and, viceversa, a description can be given one or more geometric representations, it is reasonable to assume that the geometric and the semantic representations are interchangeable [16] . Paraphrasing [2] , we say that a location privacy threat occurs when both the identity userId and the position loc are disclosed.
Location privacy is an important requirement of location-based services applications.
A location-based service is typically requested through a query issued by a mobile client and answered by the LBS provider based on the current position of the client. An example of such a query is: which is the clinic closest to me? Position information, once transferred to the LBS provider, is no longer under the control of the user and thus can be arbitrarily used, for example for unsolicited advertisement purposes. To avoid abuses against privacy, the collection of personal location data by third parties is increasingly regulated by law [4] . Complementary, technological solutions are being investigated to protect personal information when data are lost, stolen or LBS providers behave dishonestly.
A naive technique to protect location privacy in LBS is to remove the user's identifier from service requests. Unfortunately, the simple removal of the identifier may be not sufficient to anonymize requests because identity may be inferred from the association of the user's location with some external data source. For example if the position of an individual is known to be inside a non-publicly accessible office, it is likely that such individual works at that office and thus can be easily identified. Moreover, applications may need to have available identity information for accounting and user authentication.
Various techniques have been recently developed which attempt to protect either the identity or the actual location of the user.
The basic idea underlying most schemes is to hide the actual position by forwarding to the LBS provider a coarse location, at low spatial resolution. The operation of deliberately degrading the quality of the information about an individual's location is also called location obfuscation. We can abstractly think of location obfuscation as a function which takes in input the actual position of an individual and returns a location which is either imprecise (i.e. the information lacks specificity) or inaccurate (i.e. it lacks correspondence between information and reality) [17] .
Location obfuscation techniques typically use geometric methods such as geometric transformations and space subdivision to generate coarse locations. We refer to these techniques as geometry-based. Note that geometry-based techniques do not consider "what" is contained in space, that is, the spatial entities that populate the world, the places and their relationships. In other words those techniques do not account for geographical knowledge. We believe that the lack of concern for the semantics of space may lead to privacy breaches. In particular, we claim that an adversary with sufficient geographical knowledge may infer sensitive location information from obfuscated locations generated by geometric-based techniques. To support our claim we present the example below.
A motivating example
Assume that John is subscriber of a LBS application. John does not want to let anyone know that he has health problems. Therefore he does not want to reveal his position when being in a hospital. Conversely John is not concerned with location privacy when in other places, say a park.
Consider the following geographical context: assume a hospital close to a lake and to a residential district; each of these places, i.e. the lake, the district and the hospital cover a polygonal region. Suppose that no boats are allowed on the lake. Now assume that John requests a service from a certain position p and that an obfus-cated location o is computed and transmitted to the LBS provider in place of p. How the obfuscated location is obtained is not actually relevant. Now suppose that an adversary has the same knowledge we have of the geographical context. From the observation of the spatial relationships existing between the obfuscated location and real world entities, like the topological relationship of spatial containment, overlapping and disjointness, the adversary may likely infer whether the user is located in a hospital and thus in a sensitive place.
In particular consider the following three cases:
(a) The obfuscated location o is spatially contained in the extent of the hospital. In this case, the user still results to be located in a sensitive place although the actual position is blurred to a coarser region.
(b) o includes the extent of both the hospital and the lake. Since the user cannot be physically located inside the lake, because no boats are allowed on the lake, the only realistic position is within the hospital and thus the obfuscated location is still sensitive. Notice that in this case information about the user's obfuscated location is combined with publicly available information, that is, that no boat is allowed on the lake, in order to infer more precise information about the actual location of the user.
(c) o overlaps part of the hospital and part of the residential district. Since only the hospital is a sensitive place for John, we can say that the obfuscated location is "sensitive to some extent".
This example emphasizes the fact that a location, besides a geometric shape, has a qualitative meaning which depends on the entities spatially related to such location. The semantics of space is what ultimately determines the sensitivity of the location. Furthermore, it is important to note that different locations may have different degrees of sensitivity, depending also on the perception of the user of what is sensitive. From this observation it follows a key requirement, that is, the techniques for the generation of obfuscated locations must take into account the qualitative context in which users are located and move. To address such requirement, in this paper we propose a novel obfuscation framework based on the use of geographical knowledge, referred to as obfuscation system. In this paper we present the core components of the obfuscation system:
1. a semantics-aware obfuscated space model.
2. an algorithm, called SensF low, for the generation of obfuscated spaces of which we report an experimental evaluation.
To our knowledge, such framework is the first proposing an articulated approach to location obfuscation based not only on geometric criteria but also on non-trivial geographical knowledge.
Paper organization
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Next section overviews related work.
Then we introduce the baseline of the proposed appoach and an architectural framework of the obfuscation system. The obfuscation model is presented in the subsequent section followed by the obfuscation method and the SensF low algorithm along with the experimental evaluation. Two final sections, reporting respectively a generalization of the approach and future research directions, conclude the paper.
Related work
In this section we overview related work concerning location privacy and recent advances in data privacy for relational databases. Early proposals focus on the specification of privacy policies. Privacy policies state who and when a subject is allowed to get location information concerning a specific individual.
The drawback of privacy-policy based approaches is that they provide a strong protection only when LBS providers are trustworthy. Trustworthiness however is costly to ensure. Therefore a more realistic assumption is that personal location data are subject to privacy attacks. Note that we use the notion of privacy attack in informal way to mean that an adversary can detect with certainty the actual location of the user. A first attempt to formalize the concept of privacy attack is presented in [3] . Most recent work comprises two main categories of privacy models, focusing respectively on the protection of location information when the user cannot be anonymous, and the concept of k-anonymity.
Privacy models for the protection of location information
Following Atallah and Frikken [1] , the problem can be succintly formulated as follows:
given a query such as "give me the address of the post-office that is nearest to my current position", how can the query be processed by the database without knowing the actual position of the requester? Atallah and Frikken propose three methods of varying complexity to process nearest-neighbor queries that we illustrate in detail. The first approach is straightforward; the client applies a geometric translation to the user's precise position and forwards the approximated position to the LBS provider. The database answers the query and returns an approximated answer. The second method does not result in any accuracy loss but can potentially require more communication. The idea is to subdivide the space in a grid of cells. The client queries the database with the tile, thus with an obfuscated location, that contains the client's location. The database answers the query with all spatial objects that are closest to at least one point in the query tile. Upon receiving these objects the client determines which of them is closest to the actual position. The third approach is more efficient and does not require any obfuscation of the user's position. The basic idea is that the set of spatial objects in the database are processed so as to produce a Voronoi diagram, that is, a subdivision of the plan into cells such that each cell is associated with one of the objects of concern. Then a secure-multiparty protocol [7] is used to assess whether the user's position is contained in a cell without revealing to the database anything other than the Yes/No answer to the question. If the answer is Yes, the object associated with the cell is the one closest to the user. Note that using a secure-multiparty protocol is much like using a trusted third-party getting the actual position of the user and the Voronoi diagram and then matching such position against the cells. Finally note that this mechanism can be only applied to spaces which are partitioned.
Another approach for the processing of nearest-neighbor queries is proposed by Duckham and Kulik [8] . In this case the geographic space is represented in the database as a planar graph. The vertexes of the graph denote for example locations of objects and users while the edges represent how such locations are connected by roads. Edges have associated a weight representing the distance between two adjacent vertexes. The client obfuscates position p by supplying a set P of arbitrary positions including p. The database then answers the nearest-neighbor query by determining the objects (vertexes) that are closest to any point in P . Then, in the simplest case, the database returns the whole set of vertexes leaving the client to choose among them.
Cheng et al. [6] focuses on a different class of spatial queries. The problem is formulated as follows: given a space populated by n users {u 1 , ...u n } located in uncertain (i.e. obfuscated) positions and represented as closed regions, determine which of them are located within distance C from a given user u i . Such queries are called imprecise location-based range queries. Basically the idea is to process the query for each point of the location of u. Hence, unlike the approach by Atallah and Frikken, each possible answer is assigned a probability. We observe that the emphasis of such approach is on query processing and not on obfuscation techniques.
Protection of user identity through k-anonymity
The concept of k-anonymity has been originally defined for relational databases. A relational table T is k-anonymous when for each record there are at least (k-1) other records whose values, over a set of fields, referred to as quasi-identifier, are equal. A quasi-identifier is a set of one or more attributes which, though does not not contain an explicit reference to the individual identity, can be easily linked with external data sources and in this way reveal who the individual is. k-anonymity can be achieved by generalizing the quasi-identifier values. Generalization is thus performed by replacing a value with a less specific but semantically consistent value [15] . The value of k quantifies the degree of privacy in T .
In the LBS context, the k−anonymity concepts are translated as follows: like a table record, a request is a tuple of values including the user's location and the locationbased query. The location attribute is treated as a quasi-identifier. A request is thus k−anonymous if the user's location is indistinguishable form the location of other k − 1 individuals. Finally a generalized location is a region containing the position of k individuals. Note that a generalized location is nothing but an obfuscated location.
Typically k−anonymity techniques are applied using a three-tier architecture consisting, beyond a client and a server, of a trusted intermediary, the anonymizer. The anonymizer receives the user's service request, removes the user's identity, acquires and generalizes the location of the user and then forwards it to the LBS. The LBS in turn processes the request and returns the anonymizer a set of candidates containing the actual results.
Location generalization techniques generate obfuscated locations independent of the query type. The first technique has been proposed by Gruteser and Grunwald. Their approach is based on a recursive subdivision of the space in quadrants. The set of quadrants is represented by a quadtree data structure [9] . The quadtree is then traversed top down, thus from the largest quadrant covering the whole space, until the smallest quadrant is found which includes the requester and enough users to satisfy the anonymity constraint k. Such a final quadrant constitutes the generalized location.
Another technique based on quadtrees has been proposed in Casper [12] . The anonymizer uses a hash table to directly locate the user. Such table contains the pointer to the lowestlevel cell in the quadtree-based data structure in which each user is located and the user 
Beyond k−anonymity
Finally we discuss related work concerning advances in data privacy for relational databases.
Recently several papers have pointed out that k−anonymity has a number of drawbacks and thus it does not ensure a sufficient protection against a number of privacy attacks.
For example k−anonymity can generate groups of records that leak information due to the lack of diversity in the sensitive attribute. Such an information leak is called homogeneity attack. As an example consider a table T consisting of the three following attributes: Zip Code and Age represent a quasi-identifier, Disease is a sensitive attribute. Assume a publicly-available, k−anonymous dataset T composed of groups of at least k records and assume that all the tuples in a certain group have an identical value for the sensitive attribute, say ([13000 − 13099], [40 − 50], cancer). Then, if John is known to be present in the table, live at zip code 13057 and be 44 years old, one can immediately infer that John has the cancer, albeit the table is k−anonymous. l-diversity is a possible counter-measure against such attack. The main idea of l−diversity is the requirement that the values of the sensitive attributes must be well represented in each group [11] . In its simpler form, l−diversity means that each group should have at least l distinct values.
Another criticism against k−anonymity is that it does not take into account personal anonymity requirements. For example, consider the previous table T , assume it to be 2-anonymous. Consider a group consisting of the following tuples:
. If John is known to belong to such a group, then it is easy to infer that John must have suffered from bronchitis or pneumonia, which is acceptable according to k−anonymity and also l−diversity. However, John may want not to disclose that he has had respiratory problems. On the other hand, an individual suffering from flu may be unconcerned with the disclosure of the sensitive attribute value. To address this requirement, Xian and Tao [18] introduce the concept of personalized anonymity. The main idea is to organize the values of sensitive attributes in a taxonomy and then let each user specify through a guarding node the most specific value of the attribute that the user wants to disclose. Interestingly, this approach attempts to protect the association between a user and the meaning of the sensitive attribute, which is close to what we propose. Unfortunately this technique can be only applied to categorical attributes.
Semantics-aware obfuscation
The main idea is as follows: users specify which places they consider sensitive and the desired degree of privacy in a privacy profile. Based on the privacy profile, the privacy- An adversary cannot thus infer with certainty that the user is inside a sensitive (for the user) place. At most one can infer that the position may be in a sensitive place. To implement this strategy, we propose a privacy-preserving framework based on a number of key concepts.
-Sensitive places. We assume to classify relevant places in categories or types of spatial objects. Each user can specify which types of places are sensitive, nonsensitive or unreachable. A place is sensitive when the user does not want to reveal to be in that area; a place is unreachable when nobody can be located in that place; conversely a place is non-sensitive.
-Level of sensitivity. It the metrics which quantifies the level of location privacy leak the user is exposed to when located in a region. For example a region entirely occupied by a hospital has a high level of sensitivity. We emphasize that the level of sensitivity depends on the extent and nature of the objects located in the region as well as the privacy concerns of the user.
-Obfuscated space. It is a partition of the reference space consisting of obfuscated Figure 1 illustrates the functional components of the obfuscation system. The first building block is the obfuscated spaces repository. Such repository stores the obfuscated spaces which are generated based on the privacy preferences of users. Because obfuscated spaces only need to be generated once and then used every time a position is obfuscated, it seems reasonable to assume that the obfuscated space is created off-line and not during the re-quest processing. Each obfuscated space in the repository has a privacy profile. Such profile specifies user preferences, in particular which values are assigned as input to the parameters of the obfuscation algorithm. The obfuscation algorithm is run by the obfuscated space Generator. The GeoDB is the spatial database, which contains the spatial entities of concerns for the application. Both the Generator and the GeoDB must be trusted.
Reference architecture
User interaction is as follows. The user starts a session by specifying the obfuscation space to consider in the session. When the user requests a LBS, the query is sent to the obfuscation system. The obfuscation enforcement module then retrieves the actual user's position through the positioning system interface. Since the details of how the position is obtained are not relevant for our work, we assume that the user's position is known with a high level of accuracy and precision and is provided in the form of georeferenced coordinates x and y and that the communication of user position is safe. Then the obfuscation enforcement module matches the actual position against the obfuscation space associated with the session; finally the resulting obfuscated location along with the query is forwarded to the LBS provider. As it is the operational core of the system, the obfuscation enforcement module must be trusted.
The obfuscation model
We now present the basic concepts of the obfuscation model. We first introduce some assumptions on space. Then we introduce the important notions of sensitivity level and obfuscated spaces, which are the key notions of our approach.
Space S is a coordinate space of 1, 2 or higher dimension. The position of a user is a point in S. Throughout the paper, we use the term location to broadly denote a portion of space containing the user's position. A region in S is a bounded, connected subset of space of the same dimension of S. Without loss of generality, in the rest of the paper we consider 2D-spaces; therefore a region is represented by a polygon.
Space is populated by spatial objects representing real world entities such as buildings and roads. Following a popular data model, spatial objects are modeled in terms of OGC simple features. A feature has an unique name, say Milano, and a unique feature type, say
City. Furthermore, a feature has attributes and a geometric extent of type point, line, polygon or collection of disjoint geometries [14] . An advantage of our approach is that spatial objects can be stored in commercial spatial DBMSs and easily displayed as maps.
Furthermore, it supports fine-grained and application-dependent privacy requirements.
Our approach is also extensible in that new feature types can be easily created from the initial spatial database. In what follows, without significant loss of generality, we assume that the features of interest are of polygonal type. We denote with F T and F respectively the set of features types and the set of corresponding features. Hereinafter we refer to the pair (F T, F ) as the geographical database of the application.
Users specify their preferences about the feature types that are to be considered sensitive and unreachable for the generation of the obfuscated space. We say that a feature type is sensitive when it denotes a set of sensitive places. For example if Religious Building is a sensitive feature type, then Duomo di Milano, an instance of Religious Building, is a sensitive feature. We say instead that a features type is non-reachable when it denotes a set of places which, for various reasons, such physical impediment, cannot be accessed by the user. For example, the feature type MilitaryZone may be non-reachable if the user is a common citizen.
The user specifies sensitive and unreachable features in the privacy profile. As we will see, the user can add further parameters in this profile. The privacy profile is then used by the obfuscation system for the generation of the obfuscated space. Ideally a user can define multiple privacy profiles and thus be associated with multiple obfuscation spaces.
Sensitivity level
Assume that a user has chosen a set of sensitive (unreachable) features types. The next step is to define a metric to quantify how much sensitive an arbitrary location is with respect to the user's privacy requirements. Such a metric is called sensitivity level (SL).
The value of SL depends on: a) the classification of features types. For example if only few features are sensitive, it is likely that the sensitivity level in the region is low. b)
The nature of the location. For example a location enclosing a large hospital is likely more sensitive than a region enclosing a small clinic. b) The perception of users. For example, typically a hospital is not a sensitive feature for a doctor while it may be so for an individual with health problems. To model SL we introduce the notions of sensitive location probability and sensitivity score.
• Sensitive location probability. The sensitive location probability P sens with respect to a region r is the probability that the user, if known to be in r, is actually located in the extent of any sensitive feature in r. We assume that a user has equal likelihood of being located in whatever point in space. The value P sens is computed by the system based on the extent of the sensitive feature types in the region.
• Sensitivity score. The sensitivity score of a feature type defines "how much private" the information of being in a region of that type is for the user. For example the score of the restaurant feature type is typically lower than the score of hospital because an individual is usually more concerned with the privacy of medical information than with information about his/her preferred restaurants. The score is assigned a quantitative value ranging between 0 and 1: value 0 means that the feature type is not sensitive, while value 1 means that the feature type has the highest sensitivity. The score of each sensitive feature type is specified directly by the user in the privacy profile.
The computation of the sensitivity level
Based on the previous concepts, we now specify how to compute the value SL for a region, given a privacy profile. We use the following notation: E is the set of regions in the reference space; the pair (F T, F ) is the geographical database, namely the set of features types and features;
F T Sens ⊆ F T is the set of sensitive feature types, while F T N reach ⊆ F T is the set of non-reachable features, with F T N reach F T Sens = ∅. Given a region r, the functions:
Area Geo (r) and Area F ea (r, f t) compute respectively the whole area of r and the area of r covered by features of type f t. In the latter case, only the portions of features which are contained in r are considered. Score(f t) is the score assigned to feature type f t.
We now introduce Area Rel (r), the function computing the relevant area of r, that is, the portion of region not covered by unreachable features:
Next we define the function P Sens (r) computing the sensitive location probability of r as the ratio of the area covered by sensitive features to the relevant area of the region:
If r only consists of unreachable features we define P sens (r) = 0.
Finally, we define the sensitivity level of the region SL Reg (r). SL Reg (r) is computed as sum of the ratios of weighted sensitive areas to the relevant area in the region. According to our metrics region c 1 is more sensitive than c 0 . The motivation is that users located in region c 1 are certainly located in the extent of a feature of type f t 3 , which has a high sensitivity score.
Obfuscated space
Now we introduce the concept of obfuscated space. As first step we extend the notion of sensitivity level from regions to space partitions. A space partition consists of a set of disjoint cells covering the reference space S. The sensitivity level of a partition is defined as the maximum value of the sensitivity levels of the partition cells. We denote with Π(S) the set of partitions over space S. -F T Sens ⊆ F T be a set of sensitive feature types.
-F T N reach ⊆ F T be a set of non-reachable feature types.
-Score be the score function.
-θ sens ∈ [0, 1] be the sensitivity threshold value.
Then:
(1) An obfuscated space OS is a space partition in Π(S) such that: SL P ar (OS) ≤ θ sens
(2) The privacy profile associated with OS is the tuple < F T Sens , F T N reach , Score, θ sens >.
Example 2 With reference to example 1, consider the profile:
where f t 0 represents night clubs,f t 1 religious buildings and f t 3 clinics.
-f t 4 represents public gardens and is not a sensitive feature type
-Score(f t 0 ) = 0.5, Score(f t 1 ) = 0.7, Score(f t 2 ) = 0, Score(f t 3 ) = 0.9, Score(f t 4 ) = 0
-θ sens = 0.9
Consider the four regions {c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 } and the sensitivity level of each of them reported in Figure 2 . It can be noticed that such value, in all cases, is less than θ sens . Thus, the set of regions constitutes an obfuscated space.
Computation of the obfuscated space
After having presented the privacy model, we discuss how to generate an obfuscated space. The basic idea is to segment the space in locations starting from an initial finegrained discretization of space by repeatedly merging adjacent regions until a termination condition is met. Specifically, this strategy is articulated in three main steps.
1. Specification of the initial partition. The space is subdivided in a set of small cells which constitute the initial partition denoted as C in ∈ Π(S). The initial partition can result, for example, from a regular tessellation of space, or from an application-driven subdivision. The granularity of the initial partition, that is, how small the cells are, is an application-dependent issue which is not addressed here.
2. Setting of input parameters. Input parameters are specified in the privacy profile < F T Sens , F T N reac , Score, θ sens >.
3. Iterative method. The current partition is checked to assess whether it is an obfuscated space for the given profile. If this is the case, the process terminates.
Otherwise each cell which has a level of sensitivity higher than θ sens is merged with an adjacent cell. The result is a new current partition. This step is iterated until the solution is found or the partition degenerates into the whole space. The iterative method is detailed in what follows.
The iterative method
Given two adjacent cells c 1 , c 2 ∈ C, the operation which merges the two cells generates a new partition C ′ in which cells c 1 and c 2 are replaced by cell c = c 1 c 2 . We say that partition C ′ is derived from partition C, written as C ′ C. Consider the set P C in of partitions derived directly or indirectly from the initial partition C in through subsequent operations of merge. It can be easily shown that the poset H = (P C in , ) constitutes a bounded lattice in which the least element is the initial partition while the greatest element is the partition consisting of a unique element, that is, the whole space (called maximal partition).
We claim that an obfuscated space can be generated by progressively aggregating SL reg (c) ≤ max (SL reg (c 1 ), SL reg (c 2 )).
Theorem 5.2 Consider the two partitions C A and C B . The following implication holds:
We say that the sensitivity level of a partition is weakly anti-monotonic with respect to the "be derived" relation.
Corollary 5.3
Consider the maximal partition, that is, the partition consisting of a unique region, denoted as M ax. The following hold:
(1) SL par (M ax) ≤ θ sens implies that at least one obfuscated space can be generated.
(2) if C is an obfuscated space then:
(3) SL par (M ax) > θ sens implies that no obfuscated space can be generated.
The SensF low algorithm
Multiple obfuscated spaces can be generated for the same profile. We consider optimal the obfuscated space with the maximum cardinality, thus possibly consisting of the finestgrained regions. The problem we address can be formulated as follows:
Given an initial partition C in and a profile < F T Sens , F T N reach , Score, θ sens > determine, if it exists, the sequence of merge operations such that the resulting partition C is an obfuscated space with the maximum number of number of cells, that is:
Since we are not aware of any algorithm computing the optimal solution, we present an algorithm which computes an approximated solution for this problem. The idea is to progressively expand each cell which is over-sensitive (that is, for which the level of sensitivity exceeds the threshold value) until a terminating condition is met. This approach raises a number of issues. The first issue is how to choose the cell to be merged.
A reasonable approach is to select the adjacent cell which most reduces the sensitivity level of partition. A second issue concerns the criteria for the expansion of cells. To address such issue, we have identified two basic strategies: the first strategy is to expand one over-sensitive cell at a time, until the sensitivity level is below the threshold; the second strategy is to expand "in parallel" all cells which are over-sensitive. The second strategy is the one which has been adopted because it achieves a better control over the size of each location. In what follows we outline the algorithm.
Implementation
We represent a space partition through a Region Adjacency Graph (RAG) [13] . In general a RAG is defined from a partition by associating one vertex to each region and by creating an edge between two vertices if the associated regions share a common boundary. In addition we label each vertex v of the RAG with a tuple < a 1 , a 2 , ...a n > specifying for each feature type f t i ∈ F T , with i ∈ [1, n] and n = |F T |, the size a i of the area covered by features of type f t i in v. Within this framework, the edge information is interpreted as a possibility to merge the two regions identified by the vertices incident to the edge.
Such a merge operation collapses the two vertices incident to the edge into one vertex and removes this edge together with any double edge between the newly created vertex and the remaining vertices [5] .
Starting from the RAG corresponding to the initial partition, the algorithm shrinks the graph by merging adjacent cells until the sensitivity level of the partition is less or equal the threshold value or the RAG is degenerated into a unique vertex. At each step, the iterative algorithm selects the pairs of cells to merge. In case a cell c can be merged with different cells, the algorithm analyzes each possible merge operation and selects the one which minimizes the sensitivity level of the resulting region in case such a value is less than or equal to the SL of c. Note that two cells can be merged although the resulting region has the same sensitivity to enable the combination of cells which are separated by unreachable cells (e.g. an island separated from the mainland).
The pseudo-code of the algorithm is reported in Algorithm 1. The input parameters are: 1) the initial RAG built on the initial partition (parameter G); 2) the sensitivity threshold (parameter θ sens ). The algorithm returns an obfuscated space if it exists, otherwise the maximal partition consisting of a unique vertex. The internal representation of the RAG is based on adjacency lists. The algorithm repeatedly examines the over-sensitive cells; each over-sensitive cell is then merged with at most one cell at each iteration following a breadth-first strategy. repeat ⊲ loop 1 3: modif ied ←− f alse 4: for v 1 ∈ V (G) do ⊲ loop 2 5: if v 1 .SL > θ sens then 6: best sens ←− v 1 .SL
7:
best vertex ←− nil 8: for each v 2 ∈ v 1 .adjacent do ⊲ loop 3 9: if SL(v 1 , v 2 ) ≤ best sens then 10:
best sens ←− SL(v 1 , v 2 ) until ¬modif ied 21: end procedure Specifically the input graph is processed as follows: Loop 2 repeatedly scans the list of vertices V (G), to find those which have a level of sensitivity higher then the input threshold value. Once a vertex is found, say v, the algorithm analyzes the adjacency list of v to find a vertex to merge with v (Loop 3). If the sensitivity of the vertex resulting from the merge, e.g. SL(v 1 , v 2 ) is less than the sensitivity of the current vertex, the algorithm proceeds with the merge operation. In case more than one candidate exists, the vertex which determines the minimum level of sensitivity is selected. Loop 2 then proceeds to scan the remaining vertices. The whole loop is repeated until no vertex is modified. Termination occurs when either every vertex has a level of sensitivity less or equal the threshold value or it is not possible to further improve the sensitivity of vertices.
We measure the complexity of this algorithm based on the number of two key operations: (a) the merge of two vertices, (b) the number of edges analyzed. Let n be the number of vertices, and m the number of edges. We observe that no more than n merge operations can be performed before a single vertex is found. Thus, loop 1 is executed at most n times and, since at each iteration we perform at least one merge, the total number of merge operations (a) is O(n). At each step we consider all the edges incident to over-sensitive vertices, each corresponding to a potential merge (O(m) edges analyzed, in the worst case. Thus, the total number of edges considered before termination is O(m * n). Since we are considering a planar graph, the number of edges is proportional to the number of vertices. Therefore the number of edges analyzed (b) is O(n 2 ).
Example
The major steps of the algorithm are illustrated in Figure 3 . We consider an initial partition and assume sensitivity threshold to be set to θ sens = 0.75. Each sub-figure in Figure 3 represents the current partition at each step of the algorithm; the tables report the area per cell and feature type. The rightmost column reports the score of feature types and the last row the SL of cells.
We observe that in Figure 3 
Experimental evaluation
The experimental setting is as follows: a) We assume an initial partition consisting of a regular grid of 100 squared cells. The neighbors of cells that we consider are exclusively the four cells on the north, south, east and west side; therefore each vertex of the RAG has degree four. b) Cells may include sensitive features. If so the cell is termed sensitive.
We consider a unique sensitive feature type with score 1. c) The extent of the sensitive area in a cell has a value between 1 and 10 randomly assigned. Similarly, each cell is assigned a value in the same range for the area which is relevant but non sensitive. d)
The density of sensitive cells in a grid is a parameter of the experiment denoted as p;
p=0.8 means that 80% of cells contains sensitive features and those cells are uniformly distributed. e) For each value of p, ranging from 0.9 to 0.01 (the figures reports only 4 values), we have generated 100 grids, each with a different spatial distribution of sensitive features.
To simplify the interpretation of results, an obfuscated space is represented graphically. Figure 4 shows obfuscated spaces generated for different values of the sensitivity threshold. The result is visualized as follows: adjacent cells which have not been merged are assigned different gray tones; merged cells have an identical gray tone and are labeled by the same number. We can observe that the granularity of obfuscated locations (i.e. a set of cells with identical label) is coarser for lower values of θ sens .
The plot in (Figure 5 .a ) shows the average number of cells which, in the initial partitions, exceed the sensitivity threshold θ sens . For example, it can be noticed that for We now present the results of three tests. Note that the plots do not report results
for the values of the sensitivity threshold for which no meaningful solution is found, that is, the solution either does not exist or degenerates into the whole space. Notice that, if a meaningful solution does not exist for a value of the sensitivity threshold, then such a solution does not exist for all values that are smaller than this value. The first two tests ( Figure 5 .b, Figure 5 .c) evaluate the computational cost of the algorithm. Such cost depends on two factors: the number of merge operations which are performed before a termination condition is met; the number of edges which are analyzed.
It can be noticed, for example, that when p = 0.8 and θ sens = 0.6, an obfuscated space is found, on average, after 25 merge operations and the analysis of 100 edges; instead when θ sens = 0.3 the algorithm cannot generate a meaningful solution. We observe that both measures respect the worst case complexity analysis for n = 100.
The third test ( Figure 5 .d) computes the average size of the largest obfuscated location in resulting spaces. Such value is determined by the number of original cells in that location. This measurement gives an idea of the quality, i.e. the precision, of the obfuscated space: the higher is its value and the more imprecise are the obfuscated locations.
In the figure it can be noticed that, for example, with p = 0.8 and θ sens = 0.6, the value of the measurement is nearly 5: it means that the largest obfuscated location consists on average of 5 original cells. It can be observed that the value of measurement increases rapidly as θ sens gets closer to the sensitivity level of the maximal partition (i.e. the whole space).
Open issues
In this paper we have presented a first approach to the problem of protecting the location privacy of individuals that can be located in sensitive places. Because of the novelty of the idea, several issues are still open and will be addressed as part of our future research.
Issues can be grouped in three main classes depending on whether they pertain the privacy model, the computation of the obfuscated space or the architectural framework. A straightforward approach is to use a trusted obfuscation server (TOS). The TOS stores obfuscation spaces and their associated and univocally identified privacy profiles . Obfuscated spaces can be generated as follow: users specify a privacy profile, for example by filling in a form. Then based on that input the TOS creates the obfuscated space and stores it in the local repository. Users might be even allowed to browse and select privacy profiles from the TOS repository. The client maintains locally a copy of the privacy profiles of interest. At run time, when the user issues a request, the client forwards the identifier of the privacy profile to the TOS along with the query and the client identity. The TOS gets the actual position p of the client and through the obfuscation enforcement module determines the cell of the obfuscated space containing p. The TOS finally forwards that cell to the LBS provider which answers the query based on the imprecise position being sent.
The drawback of this scheme is the need of a dedicated and trusted server.
To overcome this limitation, an alternative approach is to distribute functionalities directly onto the client and the server side. Assume clients to be location-aware and have enough intelligence and resources. The idea is to let the client store locally the obfuscated spaces of interest. Obfuscated spaces can be generated directly by the LBS server or by a third party and then returned to the client in the form of maps. The user must trust the provider of obfuscated spaces; for example maps can be accompanied by a digital certificate. The run-time operations are implemented at the client side. Therefore upon a service request, the client determines the obfuscated location and then can directly forward the cell to the LBS provider without the need of intermediaries.
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a comprehensive framework for the obfuscation of personal locations based on a semantics-aware model and a novel algorithm for the generation of obfuscated spaces. We have also discussed various open problems and major challenges.
We observe that, albeit the application scenario presented in the paper focuses on LBS, the idea of the obfuscation system is general concern and can be exploited in various application contexts, for example for the sanitization of databases containing personal location data.
Since W (c) = W (c 1 ) + W (c 2 ), and Area rel (c) = Area rel (c 1 ) + Area rel (c 2 ), the inequality is equivalent to W (c 1 ) + W (c 2 ) Area rel (c 1 ) + Area rel c 2 ) ≤ W (c 1 ) Area rel (c 1 ) and, with some simple algebraic operation, to W (c 2 ) · Area rel (c 1 ) − W (c 1 ) · Area rel (c 2 ) ≤ 0
The same expansion, applied to the second inequality of the thesis, gives W (c 2 ) · Area rel (c 1 ) − W (c 1 ) · Area rel (c 2 ) ≥ 0
Since one of the two inequalities must be necessarily true, the thesis is true.
Theorem 5.2 proof: Assume C A = C B otherwise the demonstration is trivial. Now, suppose that C A is directly derived from C B , using a single merge operation. Lemma 5.1 states that the resulting cell c has an equal or a smaller sensitiveness level than the replaced cells. Based on definition 4.2, the level of sensitiveness of a partition is determined by the higher level of sensitiveness of its cell. It follows that SL(C A ) ≤ SL(C B ).
Consider now a sequence of merging operations each generating an intermediate partition I 0 , I 1 ..., I k such that C A :
Based on the previous lemma it follows that:
therefore SL(C A ) ≤ SL(C B ) that is what we wanted to demonstrate.
Corollary 5.3 proof: In case SL par (M ax) ≤ θ sens , then M ax is an obfuscated space, hence the proposition (1) is true. The assertion (2) follows from the anti-monotonicity of
